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REFLECTIONS ON R.A. V.
EDWARD J. CLEARYt
"All great truths begin as blasphemies. "1
"My definition of a free society is a society where it is safe to be
unpopular. "2
The same year that George Bernard Shaw reflected on truth,
seventy-eight-year-old Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., laid
the groundwork for the beginning of modern First Amend-
ment3 doctrine with his opinion in Schenck v. United States4 and
his dissent in Abrams v. United States.5 Both cases involved de-
fendants who distributed pamphlets in opposition to World
War I. In warning of the necessity to be "eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we
loathe, ' 6 Justice Holmes revealed a great truth that to many
must have appeared to be blasphemy. At the time Schenck and
Abrams were decided, the doctrine of free expression about
which Shaw and Justice Holmes wrote was not universally ac-
cepted. By 1952, while Adlai Stevenson reflected on the right
of an American citizen to be "unpopular" in a free society,7
other national figures were engaged in systematic repression of
the right of political association that contributed to the erosion
t Attorney at Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. B.A. magna cum laude 1974, J.D. 1977,
University of Minnesota.
Mr. Cleary has represented the petitioner in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul throughout all
proceedings in the case.
1. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, ANNAJANSKA 262 (1917).
2. Adlai Stevenson, Campaign Speech in Detroit, Michigan (Oct. 7, 1952), in
MAJOR CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF ADnLi E. STEVENSON 218 (1953).
3. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceable to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding that words and actions which ordinarily would
be within the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment are not protected
in situations, like war, where they would cause a clear and present danger which Con-
gress has a right to avoid).
5. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
6. Id. at 630.
7. See supra note 2.
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of human liberty in the United States.8
In the seventy-three years since the Abrams dissent, Ameri-
cans have consistently espoused their individual rights to ex-
press themselves and to dissent from the majority.
Unfortunately, many Americans do not see a contradiction in
believing in the right of free expression only when they agree
with the expression involved. Consequently, when Americans
have been confronted by expression which is offensive or unac-
ceptable to the majority, they have supported, and succeeded
in passing, repressive laws with an aim to silencing unpopular
movements and ideas,9 all the while ignoring the underlying
causes for such expression.'0
As American citizens we defend all types of unpopular ex-
pressions, not because of their value as ideas, but because of
the believer's right to believe them and express them. As a
result, many landmark First Amendment cases involve "blas-
phemous" acts." Such cases and various factual situations
force us to constantly reassess our commitment to First
Amendment freedoms. R.A.V v. City of St. Paul 12 is a classic
example of such a case.
R.A. V contrasts an unsympathetic white defendant, R.A.V.,
who holds unsympathetic and unpopular beliefs with an articu-
late, attractive African-American family seeking only to lay
claim to their share of the American Dream. A cross was
burned in the yard of this family. Clearly, they had a right not
to have their property trespassed and not to be threatened or
terrorized.
R.A.V. could have been prosecuted under a number of Min-
nesota laws which would have addressed trespassing or the
conduct of threatening or intimidating someone without hav-
ing more than an incidental effect on R.A.V.'s First Amend-
8. This movement was commonly referred to as McCarthyism after Senator Jo-
seph McCarthy (Rep., Wis.).
9. See, e.g., ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
10. A few examples of underlying causes are economic depression, unpopular
wars, and a lack of education.
11. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1961). Brandenburg involved a
white supremacy rally and the advocacy of violence. See also Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Both Cohen
and Hustler involve outrageous and obscene language.
12. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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ment freedom of expression.' 3
Instead, he was charged under St. Paul Legislative Code sec-
tion 292.02,'1 a provision which is, by agreement of both sides,
unconstitutional as written,' 5 although the Minnesota Supreme
Court attempted to preserve the ordinance with a narrowing
construction in its decision in In re Welfare of R.A. V 16 Presuma-
bly, the government went ahead with the law to outline what
they considered to be acceptable political expression. The
statement the government should have made is that any at-
tempt to target a threat, an expression of hatred, or an act of
terror would be met with the full force of the law. However,
when a prosecuting authority uses a law that punishes the ex-
pression itself and does so to make a political statement for a
community, the First Amendment is not only invoked, its very
premise is threatened.
The government has argued on several occasions that the
First Amendment was never intended to protect the burning of
a cross in the middle of the night in the yard of an African-
American family.' 7 While the factual allegations in this case
clearly reflect ugly and offensive behavior, this observation by
the prosecuting authority is a non sequitur. If the individual in-
volved is charged under a law that is constitutionally sound
and results only in an incidental impact on the individual's
13. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.713(1) (1987) (providing for up to five years
in prison for terroristic threats); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.595 (Supp. 1992) (making
damage to property punishable by up to five years imprisonment or a $10,000 fine);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.563 (1990) (providing for up to five years imprisonment or a
$10,000 fine for arson). See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
14. R.A.V. was prosecuted under ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990)
which reads as follows:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, reli-
gion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
15. The government acknowledged to the United States Supreme Court in oral
argument that it had charged R.A.V. under an unconstitutional law, but it maintained
that the Minnesota Supreme Court had succeeded in narrowly construing the law.
16. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that § 292.02 "can be narrowly inter-
preted to reach only unprotected conduct, thereby sufficiently decreasing the possi-
bility that those who wish to engage in protected expressive conduct will be
dissuaded from doing so by the potential of prosecution and sparing that ordinance
from the complete invalidation R.A.V. requests." R.A. V., 464 N.W.2d at 509.
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First Amendment rights, then clearly that individual cannot
rely on the First Amendment for protection. However, if that
person is charged under an unconstitutional law, the First
Amendment was intended to protect that individual, as it pro-
tects all American citizens, unless and until the law is cured of
defects either by legislative or judicial action.' 8
Although no one in the United States has a right to commit a
crime, every citizen in the United States who is charged with
committing a crime does have a right to be charged under a
constitutionally valid provision. The irony in R.A. V is that the
prosecuting authority had more severe sanction available, than
the sanction provided by section 292.02. t° Other provisions
would not have implicated the First Amendment and would
have addressed these despicable facts. Instead, the govern-
ment charged R.A.V. under an unconstitutional provision
while repeatedly arguing the ugly factual allegations as though
the offensiveness of R.A.V.'s alleged actions changed the con-
stitutional framework of the case.
The City of St. Paul did not prosecute R.A.V. under section
292.02 solely to punish R.A.V.'s offensive behavior. It would
appear the government had other motives in utilizing this pro-
vision since, as we have seen, other laws not implicating the
First Amendment were available to prosecute such allega-
tions.20 Instead, section 292.02 was used to establish a polit-
ical climate where expression that is felt to be offensive by a
group can be prosecuted. Indeed, certain individuals would
welcome a return to the group libel concept of Beauharnais v.
Illinois.2' While also seeking an extension of the "fighting
18. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985); see also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 1988).
19. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.713(1) (1987). This statute states that any-
one who threatens to commit a crime of violence with the purpose of terrorizing
another may be sentenced to imprisonment for up to five years. Id.
20. See supra note 19.
21. 343 U.S. 250 (1951). In Beauharnais, an individual stood on a public sidewalk
in Chicago, Illinois, and distributed anti-Negro leaflets. He was convicted of violat-
ing a Chicago ordinance which prohibited "the exhibition in any public place of any
publication which portray[ed] depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a
class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion" or exposes any of the above
listed groups to "contempt, derision or obloquy." Id. at 251. The individual chal-
lenged the ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine. The Court held that the ordi-
nance was not overbroad and that the First Amendment did not protect libelous
speech. Id. at 253.
[Vol. 18
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words" doctrine of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,22 such advo-
cates fail to see any danger in allowing the censoring of expres-
sion if the expression in question results in emotional harm to
a group. In a nation that prides itself on individual freedom,
including the freedom to think what you wish and to say what
you think, such a prospect is frightening indeed and brings to
mind Justice Black's dissent in Beauharnais:
State experimentation in curbing freedom of expression is
startling and frightening doctrine in a country dedicated to
self-government by its people. . . . If there be minority
groups who hail this holding as their victory, they might
consider the possible relevance of this ancient remark: "An-
other such victory and I am undone."
23
Many observers also have made the claim that expressions of
hatred do not add to Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas"
concept.24 What these observers ignore when they profess this
belief is that such an observation is a political judgment in it-
self as it rejects the expression and its message. Further, such
a claim ignores the basic liberty interest involved, as though
one's right to express oneself is lost if one's "idea" is consid-
ered unacceptable by the majority and thus not worthy of entry
to the marketplace.
Yet the First Amendment is a counter-majoritarian principle
that is essential to the American form of self-government. It
exists to counteract the majority's claim to acceptable expres-
sion. The history of symbolic speech bears out this counter-
22. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness stood on a public
sidewalk distributing leaflets of his faith. Id. at 569. While distributing the leaflets,
Chaplinsky denounced all religion as "rackets." Id. at 570. A disturbance ensued.
Chaplinsky was led to the police department and on the way insulted the City Mar-
shal by calling him a fascist and stating that the entire government was fascist. Id.
The Court held that some speech which is "lewd and obscene" and insulting or
" 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace" are not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at
572.
23. 343 U.S. 250, 270, 275 (1952).
24. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The following excerpt from Holmes' dissent in Abrams is commonly referred to as the
"marketplace of ideas" concept:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
19921
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majoritarian principle. We saw it in the 1930s with Stromberg v.
California.25 We saw it in the 1960s with Tinker v. United States. 6
We saw it the 1980s and 1990s with Texas v. Johnson2 7 and
United States v. Eichman.28 To say that a "burning cross" or a
"Nazi swastika" is an inherently different type of symbol than a
red communist flag, a black arm band or the burning of the
U.S. flag is to betray a political bias as to what is offensive and
what is not. All of these symbols were unacceptably offensive
to a majority of the American public at the time of their dis-
play. Today, they remain unpopular as ugly reminders of
Communism, anarchy, Nazism and the Ku Klux Klan.
"Bias motivated" laws are a recent development.29 Most of
these laws proscribe illegal conduct and enhance the severity
of the punishment for a crime committed with a bias motiva-
tion. While such laws raise issues of serious constitutional con-
cern, and may well be unconstitutional, they are at least aimed
initially at underlying conduct and not expression. When the
St. Paul City Council enacted section 292.02, it went a step be-
yond the vast majority of the bias motivated criminal laws, by
punishing the expression itself rather than the underlying con-
duct that had bias as its motivation.
Section 292.02 is a classic example of a paternalistic law
passed by a community acting out of fear. Lawmakers who
pass such laws evidence mistrust of the public's judgment.
Such a law betrays state neutrality as the government becomes
the arbiter of the "worthiness" of the ideas expressed. While
directly threatening the First Amendment right of free expres-
sion, the law does not even accomplish its purported goal. By
outlawing any expression that would upset others on the basis
of race or religion, it does not eliminate racial and religious
intolerance but simply attempts to silence the debate, at great
cost to all races and religions.
25. 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (holding that a California statute which forbade the dis-
playing of a red flag if it was displayed to show sympathy for communism was
unconstitutional).
26. 396 U.S. 864 (1969) (holding that it was a violation of students' First Amend-
ment rights for the Des Moines, Iowa, school system to suspend the students for
wearing black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War).
27. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that individuals have a First Amendment right
to burn the American flag in protest of the U.S. government).
28. 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (affirming its earlier decision in Texas v. Johnson).
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If we are truly confident in our beliefs, then we should be
able to tolerate dissent and deviant expression unless and until
the expression becomes criminal conduct in the classic sense.
When that happens, as in R.A. V, the perpetrators of the crimi-
nal conduct should be prosecuted under criminal laws. If we
cannot tolerate dissent and if we continue to act out of fear by
attempting to suppress such dissent, our actions will indicate
that we are not confident in our views and that we believe the
government should dictate each individual's beliefs.
Section 292.02 does not address discrimination in our soci-
ety and in the end it is a dangerous and empty gesture, a
misguided political statement, and a politically acceptable
"feel-good" law. It is a hollow example of the flexing of
majoritarian muscle at the expense of First Amendment free-
doms. The ordinance gives the appearance of dealing with ra-
cial and religious intolerance but only aggravates such
intolerance. The ordinance actually slows the process of win-
ning the hearts and minds of the public, by outlining a govern-
ment-imposed set of standards which define what are
acceptable opinions in the areas of race, religion or gender.
We may address individual intolerance or we may address the
larger question of societal intolerance of dissenting view-
points. Societal intolerance is a much greater threat to
freedom.
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul is a further extension of modern First
Amendment doctrine as it demonstrates that individual liberty
may be threatened just as readily by well-meaning liberals as it
has been by reactionary conservatives. It is tempting to accept
the short-term political satisfaction of silencing ugly and offen-
sive expression while ignoring the long-term cost of setting a
precedent for the censoring of unpopular expression. Yet for
two centuries, the freedom of speech clause of the First
Amendment has been the one individual right that has distin-
guished this nation from all others. Freedom of expression is
the cornerstone of our form of government and it has with-
stood attacks from all sides of the political spectrum. As the
Bill of Rights enters its third century, we must have the
1992]
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courage and the vision to prevent the power of the First
Amendment from being diminished in this manner. This chal-
lenge is the enduring legacy of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.
30
30. On June 22, 1992, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538 (1992). In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted: "Let there be no mis-
take about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible.
But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without
adding the First Amendment to the fire." Id. at 2550.
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss4/3
